Contracting Around Democratic Backsliding:Netanyahu and the Ministry of Justice
עודכן: 5 באוק׳
Nadiv Mordechay1 and Eden Lapid
Abstract
This article reveals an additional pathway for democratic backsliding – through negotiated
legal arrangements that subtly erode political norms. Using Israel as a case study, it
analyses a series of legal understandings reached between the Attorney General’s Office
and the Netanyahu governments during the period 2020 to 2026. The article develops the
concept of ‘contracting around democratic backsliding’, focusing on situations in which
legal gatekeepers avoid direct constitutional confrontation with populist executives
and instead seek to contain democratic risks through consensual legal arrangements
negotiated ‘in the shadow of the law’.
The article examines three case studies of contracting around democratic backsliding:
(i) the conflict-of-interest arrangement imposed on Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu while standing criminal trial; (ii) the Memorandum of Understanding reached
with Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir following allegations of politicising
the police; and (iii) the agreement permitting Netanyahu’s appointment of
the head of the Israeli Security Agency despite conflict-of-interest concerns arising
from ongoing investigations involving his office. In each case, the Attorney General
refrained from advancing a categorical constitutional objection and instead validated the
appointment or tenure through contractual limitations designed to constrain executive
power.
The article argues that this ‘consensual approach’ has ultimately intensified democratic
backsliding. By avoiding constitutional showdowns, the arrangements weakened
the likelihood that courts would articulate clear constitutional boundaries, normalise
previously unacceptable political conduct, and legitimise increasingly extreme exercises
of executive power. The analysis further demonstrates that repeated reliance on negotiated
accommodation gradually transformed exceptional deviations from democratic
norms into an accepted constitutional practice, while simultaneously limiting the ability
of legal institutions to reverse the process once the agreements themselves collapsed.
In the Israeli context, such negotiated arrangements inadvertently strengthen populist
entrenchment, contributing to the erosion of democratic guardrails.




